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Note
“For I Was Hungry and You Gave Me Something to
Eat”: Utilizing RLUIPA to Prevent Force-Feeding
Religiously Based Hunger-Striking Inmates
MEGAN WADE
Religiously based hunger-striking prisoners face a cruel reality—being
force-fed for adhering to their religious beliefs. Typically, hunger-striking
prisoners facing being force-fed challenge this state action as a First
Amendment violation. So far, no inmate has been successful. Congress
enacted the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
(RLUIPA) in direct response to state infringement upon prisoners’ right to
religious freedom. Because RLUIPA offers greater protection of religious
rights than does the First Amendment, religiously based hunger-striking
prisoners will have a greater likelihood of preventing a state from forcefeeding them by alleging a RLUIPA violation.
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“For I Was Hungry and You Gave Me Something to
Eat”:1 Utilizing RLUIPA to Prevent Force-Feeding
Religiously Based Hunger-Striking Inmates
MEGAN WADE*
I. INTRODUCTION
When engaging in a hunger strike based on his religious beliefs2, a
prisoner faces a myriad of negative consequences including loss of
privileges, solitary confinement, and potential force-feeding. Yet, in some
situations, prisoners may not have any other options. This Note seeks to
discuss three types of religiously based hunger strikes: (1) those for broad
religious purposes; (2) those taken in response to a prison’s failure to
provide religiously accommodating meals; and (3) religious fasts, taken in
observance of religious tenets, which oftentimes are misclassified as
hunger strikes.
An example of a hunger strike taken for broader religious purposes is
the recent hunger strikes of the Guantanamo Bay detainees. Most recently,
news spread of the large-scale force-feedings of prisoners housed at
Guantanamo Bay. Since early 2002, several large-scale hunger strikes have
taken place in response to the prisoners’ claims that they are being held
without just cause, of poor prison conditions, and of human rights
violations.3 In response to these strikes, prison officials sought injunctions
to force-feed the prisoners.
Religious strikes undertaken by prisoners due to a prison’s failure to
provide religiously accommodating meals are much more common in
prisons. Jewish prisoners, for example, believe that they must eat only
Kosher foods to comply with the Jewish body of law, Kashrut. So what
Matthew 25:35 (New Int’l).
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. 2016; Boston University, B.A. 2013. To my
husband, Matthew, for your never-ending support and encouragement. To Associate Professor Doug
Spencer and Attorney Dan Klau for your insightful comments and guidance. Finally, I would like to
thank the members of the Connecticut Law Review for their thoughtful edits.
2
This Note will utilize masculine pronouns when describing prisoners, as more than 90% of U.S.
prisoners are male. See BOP Statistics: Inmate Gender, Federal Bureau of Prisons (last updated Mar.
26, 2016), https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_gender.jsp [https://perma.cc/6GRZ8ZY8].
3
Samir Naji al Hasan Moqbel, Gitmo Is Killing Me, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013, at A19; see also
Nicolai Haddal, The 2013 Guantanamo Bay Hunger Strike, CTR. FOR STUDY HUMAN RTS. AMERICAS
(Nov. 20, 2013), http://humanrights.ucdavis.edu/reports/2013-guantanamo-bay-detainee-hunger-strike
[https://perma.cc/JB2Y-BV5M].
1
*

1234

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:1231

happens when, despite the prisoner’s request, the prison refuses to provide
Kosher meals? The prisoner is faced with the decision of violating his
sincerely held beliefs in Judaism or refusing to eat the non-Kosher meals to
keep true to his religion. If the prisoner chooses to adhere to his beliefs, he
can be classified by the prison, after just seventy-two hours of refusing
food, as participating in a hunger strike even though he is not protesting his
confinement or trying to make a political statement. In this case, he simply
cannot eat the meals provided to him by the prison in order to obey the
rules of his religion.
Last is the situation in which a prisoner undertakes a religious fast, but
subsequently is misclassified by the prison as a hunger striker. Take, for
example, a Muslim prisoner, who, during the sun-up hours of Ramadan, is
asked to provide a urine sample but cannot do so because he fasts during
these hours, and the prison has refused to provide him alternative meals
during the sun-down hours. Thus, he essentially has engaged in a hunger
strike by refusing to eat the provided meals during the sun-up hours. This
prisoner now must decide whether to break fast and consume water in
order to supply the urine sample or refuse to drink water and face being
force-fed nutrients in order to provide the sample.
This particular scenario is not hypothetical. In 2003, a New York
prison forced Darryl Holland, a Muslim prisoner, to act in opposition to his
Islamic beliefs by forcing him to consume nutrients during the sun-up
hours of Ramadan so that he could provide a urine sample.
Ultimately, this Note seeks to do two things: (1) to serve as a guide for
successful RLUIPA litigation in the recently changing area of the law
dealing with the government’s place in the regulation of religious freedom;
and (2) suggest that there are less intrusive means available to prisons for
the purpose of ending religiously based hunger strikes than force-feeding
inmates.
So then what exactly does the process of force-feeding entail? Prison
guards shackle an inmate’s arms and legs, hold his head still, and insert
more than three feet of tubing up his nose, down his throat, and into his
stomach. This is such a painful and intrusive procedure that oftentimes
prisoners knock out the tubing, cough, choke, or vomit. Prisoners also have
reported how painful the experience is. Still, prisoners endure this forcefeeding twice a day, every day, during their hunger strikes.
Prisoners historically have had little recourse against these forced
feedings. Even though the First Amendment protects a prisoner’s
fundamental right to exercise religion, courts have been hesitant to impede
the administrative policies of prisons on this matter due to concerns of the
government’s duty to preserve life and the penological interests in
maintaining prison safety and keeping costs down. Do these interests seem
compelling enough to allow a prison to subject a religiously based hungerstriking inmate to twice-a-day force-feedings? Under the First
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Amendment, the government’s interests need not be compelling to justify
force-feeding the inmates—they merely must be legitimate and rationally
related to the prison’s force-feeding policy. Under RLUIPA, however, the
government’s interests must be compelling, and the force-feeding policy
must be the least restrictive means of furthering those interests. Further,
there are options less intrusive and barbaric that do not infringe upon a
prisoner’s religious freedom than force-feeding to resolve his need to
engage in the hunger strike. Thus, this Note argues that prisoners should
raise statutory claims under RLUIPA instead of the First Amendment
because Congress added protections to religious rights in RLUIPA that are
stronger than religious protections under the First Amendment.
In Part II, this Note examines the definition of a hunger strike,
discusses various reasons why prisoners engage in hunger strikes, and
describes the two primary methods prisons use to force-feed inmates. Part
III outlines traditional First Amendment claims against prisons that violate
prisoners’ free exercise rights. This Part examines prisoners’ fundamental
right to exercise a religion of their choosing under the First Amendment.
Part III also describes Congress’ response to the difficulties that prisoners
have faced when filing First Amendment claims. The main legislative
initiatives include the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA)
and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
(RLUIPA), which Congress enacted to help provide prisoners an avenue
for legal redress. In discussing the latter Act, this Note describes how a
prisoner in a state or local prison may successfully file a claim. This Note
then discusses two recent cases in which prisoners filed claims under
RLUIPA. In Part IV, this Note examines why hunger-striking prisoners
will be successful in prohibiting a prison from force-feeding them by filing
a complaint alleging a RLUIPA violation. In general, this Note argues that
the Act provides broader protection over prisoners’ religious rights than the
First Amendment. Then, in order to help future prisoners and lawyers
taking up these cases, this Note provides a step-by-step guide on how to
file a RLUIPA claim on behalf of a religiously based hunger-striking
prisoner. In Part V, this Note then analyzes three types of hunger-striking
prisoners—ones who hunger-strike for broad, religious purposes, ones who
hunger-strike due to lack of religiously accommodating meals, and ones
whose hunger fasts mistakenly are labeled as hunger strikes—and
discusses prisoners’ probabilities of success. This Note concludes by
applying these principles to a hypothetical situation involving Steven
Hayes, one of the men convicted in the Cheshire Home Invasion arson,
rapes, and murders.
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II. RELIGIOUSLY BASED HUNGER STRIKES AND FORCE-FEEDING
A. What Is a Hunger Strike?
An inmate is defined as engaging in a hunger strike “[w]hen he or she
communicates that fact to staff and is observed by staff to be refraining
from eating for a period of time, ordinarily in excess of 72 hours; or
[w]hen staff observe the inmate to be refraining from eating for a period in
excess of 72 hours.”4 Moreover, most definitions state that competence of
the hunger striker is also necessary for it to be an actual hunger strike.5
Additionally, hunger strikers do not necessarily deny all food and
water, but rather consume some liquids, sugar, and vitamins.6 Religious
fasts, on the other hand, serve a different purpose than hunger strikes.
Prisoners participating in hunger strikes typically fast to gain attention over
a political agenda and to protest their prison conditions.7 Prisoners engage
in religious fasts, however, in order to stay true to their religious ideals.8
The problem that arises for prisoners who engage in a religious fast is that
prisons need not make a distinction between these and hunger strikes,9 so
any religious fast lasting longer than the seventy-two hours set out in the
Code of Federal Regulations section may be deemed a hunger strike, for
which the prison can seek an injunction from the court to force-feed the
inmate.10

4

28 C.F.R. § 549.61 (2011).
See, e.g., Sondra S. Crosby et al., Hunger Strikes, Force-feeding, and Physicians’
Responsibilities, 298 JAMA 563, 563 (2007) (defining a “hunger striker” as “a competent prisoner
(understanding the nature and consequences of his or her actions) who voluntarily refuses food for a
specific purpose” and indicating that “[a] food refuser who is not mentally competent does not qualify
as a hunger striker”). Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has “suggested that the Constitution gave a
competent individual the right to refuse lifesaving medical treatment. While a state could condition that
right on the establishment of clear and convincing evidence of a patient’s wishes, the right itself was
assumed.” Mara Silver, Note, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question of SelfStarvation, 58 STAN. L. REV. 631, 639 (2005).
6
See Avi Brisman, Fair Fare?: Food as Contested Terrain in U.S. Prisons and Jails, 15 GEO. J.
ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 49, 80 (2008) (discussing how some hunger strikes actually “include the
ingestion of some water or other liquids, salt, sugar, and vitamin B1 for a certain time without asserting
intent to fast to death”).
7
Steven C. Bennett, Note, The Privacy and Procedural Due Process Rights of Hunger Striking
Prisoners, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1157, 1157 (1983) (describing various reasons for hunger strikes,
including to make political statements and to protest confinement).
8
See Fasting Across Religions, BELIEFNET, http://www.beliefnet.com/Faiths/2001/02/FastingChart.aspx [https://perma.cc/LLN7-2GB4] (last visited Feb. 3, 2016) (listing, among others,
“focus[ing] on love of God and spiritual matters,” “open[ing] a person to God’s grace,” and
“[a]ton[ing] for sins and/or special requests to God” as reasons for religious fasts).
9
In fact, prisons are instructed to classify any prisoner, who has not eaten in seventy-two hours,
to be considered on a hunger strike. 28 C.F.R. § 549.61 (2011).
10
Id.
5
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B. Current Regulations Regarding Force-Feeding Inmates
One of the biggest problems with the force-feeding of inmates is that
no standardized protocol exists within federal or state prison systems to
regulate how prisons should approach hunger-striking inmates.11 In 2001,
the Department of Justice, National Institute of Corrections commissioned
a reference book to provide jail and prison administrators and correctional
health professionals with guidance in the provision of health services. This
report contains a section on hunger strikes within prison systems. 12
Specifically, the reference book recommends “that serious hunger strikes
(i.e., those lasting more than 2 or 3 days) be supervised by an
interdisciplinary committee of correction and noncorrectional personnel.”13
It emphasizes maintaining a balance between keeping the inmate aware of
the possible effects of a hunger strike and violating the inmate’s wishes.14
Because the ethical question of whether prisoners should be able to hunger
strike until they die has not been answered, inconsistencies among various
prisons exist.15 Although this does raise the important ethical question
regarding a prisoner’s right to die, this Note does not seek to analyze that
complex issue. Rather, this Note argues that prisons have less restrictive
means available to them to end religiously based hunger strikes than forcefeeding hunger-striking inmates or allowing the strike to continue until
death.
C. Methods of Force-Feeding
Force-feeding is a painful and highly intrusive way of providing a
hunger-striking inmate with nutrients. Prisons typically use one of two
methods to force-feed inmates: (1) nasogastric feeding and (2) intravenous
feeding.16
Nasogastric feeding “is accomplished by inserting a soft tube into the
nose, through the esophagus, and directly into the stomach.”17 Two specific
accounts of nasogastric feeding show just how invasive and painful the
11
B. JAYE ANNO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE., CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE: GUIDELINES FOR THE
MANAGEMENT OF AN ADEQUATE DELIVERY SYSTEM 85 (2001) (“None of the sets of national standards
specifically addresses hunger strikes.”).
12
Id.
13
Id.
14
Id. (“The task of the physician is then to keep the inmate apprised of his or her health status and
the likely consequences of change or deterioration. . . . Force-feeding the inmate clearly would violate
his or her wishes and concepts of patient autonomy . . . .”).
15
Id. (“It is not clear whether an inmate who refuses sustenance should be allowed to die without
interference from correctional or medical authorities . . . .”).
16
Bennett, supra note 7, at 1176–77 (describing three methods of force feeding: nasogastric tube
feeding, intravenous feeding, and gastronomy). This Note discusses the first two methods, as they are
the methods most commonly used in prisons.
17
Silver, supra note 5, at 637.
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the dissent provided the following

No novocaine was used during the insertion of the tube.
[The prisoner] suffered a great deal of pain and discomfort as
a result of the constant irritation of the tube on his throat and
nasal passages. His efforts to resist the painful swallowing
reflex caused him to suffer severe headaches. The tube was
removed due to the danger of imminent ulceration of his
throat and nasal passages.19
This account from plaintiff Caulk is common. The court in In re
Soliman20 recounted the plaintiff’s telling of the nasogastric feeding that he
was forced to endure:
[The prisoner] allege[d] that medical personnel initially
inserted a large tube into his nose, which did not fit. The
medical personnel then attempted to insert smaller and
smaller tubes until Soliman’s nose began bleeding internally.
The doctor ordered that Soliman be injected with an
anesthetic, and a gastric tube inserted through his mouth.
Since then, Soliman has received an injection of anesthetic
and a gastric tube through the mouth every three days.21
Intravenous treatment, which prisons utilize less frequently than
nasogastric feeding, is the second method of force-feeding.22 This method
occurs by penetrating a needle through a major blood vessel in order to
transfer nutrients directly into the prisoner’s blood stream.23 The main
problem with intravenous treatment is that “unless a prisoner is sedated, he
or she will in all likelihood attempt to obstruct treatment by pulling out the
needles used to deliver nutrients. That interference could lead to a severe
loss of blood that could be fatal in just three to four minutes.”24 Although
not as painful or humiliating as nasogastric feeding, intravenous feeding
intrudes even more on the prisoner’s person. No prisoner hunger-striking
for sincerely held religious reasons should endure this treatment simply for
following his religious tenets, given that prisons have less restrictive means
available to them to end the hunger strikes, such as providing religiously
accommodating meals.
18

480 A.2d 93 (N.H. 1984).
Id. at 99 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
20
134 F. Supp. 2d 1238 (N.D. Ala. 2001).
21
Id. at 1245.
22
Bennett, supra note 7, at 1176–77 (describing nasogastric feeding as “the preferred method of
treatment,” intravenous feeding as “disfavored,” and gastronomy as “the treatment of last resort”).
23
Silver, supra note 5, at 637.
24
Id. at 637–38.
19
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III. CURRENT REGULATION OF PRISONERS’ RIGHTS
TO FREE EXERCISE OF RELIGION
A. Prisoners’ Rights and Interests Against Being Force-Fed
Currently, prisoners most often seek legal redress to stop prisons from
force-feeding them by claiming a violation of their First Amendment right
to free exercise of religion. In this Part, this Note addresses the
development of this right and its application to hunger-striking prisoners.
This Part also examines legislative initiatives in response to prisoners’
inability to successfully plead a violation of their right to free exercise of
religion under the First Amendment.
1. First Amendment Right to Free Exercise of Religion
In the late 1980s, courts recognized the rise in prisoners’ claims
alleging that prisoners were violating their fundamental right to free
exercise of religion.25 As a result, the Supreme Court heard and decided
two cases, which set the stage for how courts should examine these
specific issues: Turner v. Safley,26 which set out a four-factor test for
determining whether a prison’s action or regulation violated a prisoner’s
First Amendment right to free exercise of religion and, if so, whether the
regulation nevertheless was justified; and O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,27
the first case to utilize this newly established test. Though these were
important cases, they caused circuit splits on the issue of a prisoner’s right
to religious freedom and great confusion among courts about which level
of scrutiny to apply when considering the religious rights of prisoners.
a. Turner v. Safley
In Turner, a case regarding the constitutionality of regulations dealing
with inmate marriages and inmate correspondence, inmates brought a class
action challenging two then-recently enacted prison regulations: the first
permitted correspondence between inmates only when it concerned legal
matters,28 and the second “permit[ted] an inmate to marry only with the
permission of the superintendent of the prison, and provide[d] that such
approval should be given only ‘when there [were] compelling reasons to
do so.’”29 The Supreme Court, recognizing the plight of prisoners trying to
protect their fundamental rights, initially stated that “[p]rison walls do not
form a barrier separating prison inmates from the protections of the
25
U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
26
482 U.S. 78 (1987).
27
482 U.S. 342 (1987).
28
Turner, 482 U.S. at 81.
29
Id. at 82.
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Constitution.” The Court also acknowledged its inability to “deal with the
increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform.”31
Because of this, the Court set out a new standard of review that would be
responsive to the “policy of judicial restraint regarding prisoner complaints
and [to] the need to protect constitutional rights.”32
The Turner Court set out a four-factor test that balanced inmates’
constitutional rights with the prison’s concerns over prison safety and
administration: whether
30

(1) the regulation is rationally connected to the legitimate
government interests offered to justify the regulation;
(2) alternative means of exercising the right remain open to
prisoners under the regulation;
(3) providing an accommodation or exceptions for inmates to
exercise the asserted right impermissibly burdens prison staff, other
inmates, or prison resources;
(4) there is absence of ready alternatives.33
In applying its own newly-formulated test, the Court held that the mail
regulation was constitutional because it was reasonably related to the goals
of institutional safety and security,34 but that the marriage regulation was
unconstitutional because it was not reasonably related to the prison’s stated
security concerns.35
b. O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz
In O’Lone, Muslim inmates challenged a new prison regulation which
required them to work off-site and thus prevented them from returning to
the prison to participate in Jumu’ah, a Muslim assembly service
commanded by the Koran.36 Petitioner prison officials conceded that the
Muslim inmates’ “sincerely held religious beliefs compelled attendance at
Jumu’ah.”37 The Court, however, found evidence of increased security
risks in having the prisoners return from off-site during the day to attend
these services.38
As it did in Turner, the Court began its analysis by emphasizing that
30

Id. at 84.
Id. (citing Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)).
32
Id. at 85 (citing Procunier, 416 U.S. at 406).
33
Id. at 89–90.
34
Id. at 93.
35
See id. at 97–98.
36
482 U.S. 342, 344–45 (1987).
37
Id. at 345.
38
See id. at 346 (explaining that one guard supervised an entire detail of inmates, which resulted
in heavy traffic at the main gate, a “high security area”).
31
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“convicted prisoners do not forfeit all constitutional protections by reason
of their conviction and confinement in prison.”39 Decided shortly after the
Turner decision was released, O’Lone applied the Court’s newly
established four-factor test. In applying that test, the Court agreed with the
district court and found that the regulation, which prevented Muslim
inmates from attending religious services, was “reasonably related to
legitimate penological objectives”40 of prison administration. To comply
with the prisoners’ request to attend services, the prison would have had to
make several accommodations “including placing all Muslim inmates in
one or two inside work details or providing weekend labor for Muslim
inmates.”41 Ultimately, the Court found that the “accommodations . . .
would have undesirable results in the institution,”42 and that the
penological objectives were legitimate. Moreover, under these prison
regulations, the Muslim inmates were “not deprived of all forms of
religious exercise, but instead freely observe a number of their religious
obligations,”43 which led the Court to find that “the restrictions at issue
here were reasonable.”44
c. The Turner/O’Lone Test
Post-Turner, courts inconsistently applied the four-factor test.45 Even
within Turner itself, the dissenting Justices “worried that the new standard
would subject inmates to the mercy of prison officials without adequate
constitutional protection.”46 A fundamental problem of the Turner test was
that it seemed to give a more lenient standard of review for the regulation
of inmate-to-inmate correspondence, but a stricter one for the regulation of
inmate marriages.47 Thereafter, circuit courts continued to disagree over
how exactly to apply the Turner test, particularly when prisons failed or
refused to provide Kosher meals.48 In fact, the Second Circuit did not even
utilize the Turner factors when it decided to grant Jewish inmates’ requests

39

Id. at 348.
Id. at 353.
41
Id. at 352.
42
Id. at 353.
43
Id. at 352.
44
Id.
45
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 112–15 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s inconsistent opinions on these issues); see also Benjamin Pi-wei Liu, A Prisoner’s
Right to Religious Diet Beyond the Free Exercise Clause, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1151, 1161–63 (2004)
(describing courts’ varying approaches to freedom of religion claims in the prison context).
46
Liu, supra note 45, at 1160 (citing Turner, 482 U.S. at 100–01 (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
47
Id. at 1160–61 (discussing the “lenient” and “strict” Turner tests).
48
See id. at 1161–62 (noting that the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits held that prisons were
required to provide a strict Kosher diet, whereas the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have denied
prisoners Kosher meals).
40
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for a Kosher diet. Thus, decisions regarding inmates’ right to exercise
religion have varied under the Turner test.
49

2. Legislative Initiatives
In response to both the inconsistent decisions under the Turner test and
the growing concern over prisoners’ struggles with prisons violating their
right to free exercise of religion,50 Congress enacted legislation to provide
guidance to courts on how to determine whether state action or regulation
violated prisoners’ fundamental right to express religion.
a. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act
Congress enacted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in
1993,51 in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Employment
Division v. Smith.52 In Smith, the respondents were fired from their jobs
because they ingested peyote during a religious ceremony. 53 When they
applied for unemployment compensation, the Oregon Employment
Division determined that they were ineligible because “they had been
discharged for work-related ‘misconduct.’”54
On certiorari to the Supreme Court, the Employment Division argued
that because Oregon had a law that made it illegal for the respondents to
consume peyote, the denial of benefits was permissible.55 The Court
determined that it could not decide whether the religious use of peyote
violated the Oregon statute, and remanded for further proceedings.56 On
remand, the Oregon Supreme Court found that the Oregon statute did, in
fact, prohibit the respondents’ religious use of peyote, and that the statute’s
prohibition was invalid under the Free Exercise Clause.57 Ultimately, the
Oregon Supreme Court held that the Employment Division could not deny
the respondents benefits.58
49
See Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (stating that O’Lone and
Turner did not “place[] in any reasonable doubt” the proposition that “prison officials must provide a
prisoner a diet that is consistent with his religious scruples”).
50
See President William J. Clinton, Remarks on Signing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
of 1993, 29 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2377, 2377 (Nov. 16, 1993) (“More than 50 cases have been
decided against individuals making religious claims against Government action since . . . [the Supreme
Court’s decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990)] was handed down. This
act will help to reverse that trend by honoring the principle that our laws and institutions should not
impede or hinder but rather should protect and preserve fundamental religious liberties.”).
51
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb–§ 2000bb-4).
52
494 U.S. 872 (1990).
53
Id. at 874.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 875.
56
Id. at 875–76.
57
Id. at 876.
58
Id.
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On certiorari again, the U.S. Supreme Court held that if “prohibiting
the exercise of religion . . . is not the object of the [law] but merely the
incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid provision,
the First Amendment has not been offended.”59 Thus, because the
respondent’s use of peyote was prohibited by statute and that prohibition
was constitutional, Oregon could deny the respondents unemployment
compensation.60
The decision in Smith “galvanized a large number of diverse religious
groups as well as civil rights organizations.”61 Based on the Court’s broad
holding, “[a] wide variety of religious and civil liberties groups reacted
with shock and anger [,] . . . considering it a fundamental assault on their
constitutional right to freedom of religion.”62 Their fears and concerns
included courts finding that “Smith did not permit the granting of
exceptions for religious beliefs for a variety of laws,” and that courts
would interpret the decision “as requiring a finding against free exercise
claims.”63
Initially, in response to Smith, professors and religious and public
interest groups petitioned the Supreme Court for a rehearing, but failed.64
The next logical step was a legislative initiative, and “[i]n July of 1990,
Representative Stephen Solarz introduced this bill, the RFRA, in the
House.”65 RFRA’s purpose was simple–“to reinstate the protection given
to religious freedom prior to Smith.”66 Additionally, the Act “prevent[ed]
governmental restriction of the free exercise of religion, unless a
compelling interest can be shown. This strict scrutiny test [wa]s applied to
federal, state and local government actions. A person whose religious
freedom [wa]s restricted illegally c[ould] bring a claim under RFRA.”67 On
November 16, 1993, President Clinton signed into law RFRA, restoring the
right to religious freedom that the Supreme Court essentially eliminated in
Smith.68
Congress stated within RFRA that the Act’s purpose was to prevent
laws that substantially burdened a person’s free exercise of religion.69
59

Id. at 878.
Id. at 890.
61
Robert F. Drinan et al., The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: A Legislative History, 10 J.L.
& RELIGION 531, 531 (1993).
62
Id. at 532.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 533.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 541.
69
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(b) (“The purposes of this chapter are—(1) to restore the compelling
interest test as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner . . . and Wisconsin v. Yoder . . . and to guarantee its
application in all cases where free exercise of religion is substantially burdened; and (2) to provide a
60
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Through its enactment of RFRA, Congress reasserted the proposition that
one’s right to express a religion of one’s choosing is a fundamental right.70
The Act stated that:
(a) In general
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of
general applicability, except as provided in subsection (b) of
this section.
(b) Exception
Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden
to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of
furthering that compelling governmental interest.71
After Congress enacted RFRA, for the first time, courts had guidance
beyond that of the inconsistently applied Turner test for addressing claims
alleging violation of one’s freedom of expression of religion.
RFRA was intended to protect not just free citizens, but also prisoners.
Senator Hatch, one of the original sponsors of RFRA, stated that “[w]e
want religion in the prisons. It is one of the best rehabilitative influences
we can have. Just because they are prisoners does not mean all of their
rights should go down the drain.”72 In applying RFRA to prisoners, the Act
required courts to use a strict scrutiny test to determine whether a prison
regulation or action violated a prisoner’s freedom to express a religion of
his choosing.73 Specifically, the Act required the government or prison to
demonstrate that the burden on the prisoner’s fundamental right was in
claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by government.”); see
also William J. Clinton, supra note 50, at 2377 (“We all have a shared desire here to protect perhaps
the most precious of all American liberties, religious freedom.”).
70
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(1) (“The framers of the Constitution, recognizing free exercise of
religion as an unalienable right, secured its protection in the First Amendment to the Constitution . . .
.”).
71
Id. § 2000bb-1.
72
139 CONG. REC. S14,367 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
73
42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b) (“Government may substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a
compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.” (emphasis added)). When deciding whether a fundamental right has been
violated, courts use a strict scrutiny test. Under a strict scrutiny analysis, “the government bears the
burden of demonstrating that its interest is ‘compelling[,]’ . . . The law must be narrowly tailored so
that the fit between the means and ends is extremely precise; in one common formulation of this
tailoring, the government must use the ‘least restrictive means’ of achieving the law’s purpose.” Daniel
J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons,
106 YALE L.J. 459, 461 (1996).
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furtherance of a “compelling” interest, and burdened that right in the “least
restrictive means.”74
Just four years after Congress enacted the Act, however, in City of
Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA as
unconstitutional as applied to state governments and state agencies.75 In a
6-3 decision, the Court held that Congress exceeded its enforcement power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment,76 and held that the Act was
unconstitutional. The Supreme Court found that the stringent RFRA test
was “a considerable congressional intrusion into the States’ traditional
prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and welfare of
their citizens.”77 Federal RFRA is constitutional,78 however, and thus
provides federal prisoners an effective means of protecting their religious
freedoms.79
b. The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act
In response to the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Boerne,80
Congress unanimously passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized
Persons Act in 2000 (“RLUIPA”).81 Specifically addressing prisoners,
RLUIPA states that
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the
religious exercise of a person residing in or confined to an
institution, as defined in section 1997 of this title, even if the
burden results from a rule of general applicability, unless the
government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on
that person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of

74

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (Stevens, J. dissenting) (“RFRA
contradicts vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.”).
76
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“The Congress shall have power to enforce [the Amendment] by
appropriate legislation . . . .”).
77
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 534 (1997).
78
See generally Gonzales v. O Centro Espírita Beneficente Uniáo do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006) (using RFRA to analyze and determine whether prohibiting the use of an otherwise illegal
substance in a religious ceremony was improper).
79
It is noteworthy that as of 2015, twenty-one states have enacted their own versions of RFRA
since City of Boerne. See State Religious Free Restoration Acts, NAT’L. CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES
(Oct. 15, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx.
Because of the variances among state RFRAs, however, for the purpose of providing consistent
analysis of potential claims, this Note focuses solely on RLUIPA and the Federal RFRA and their
application to state and federal prisoners.
80
City of Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
81
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-274, 114 Stat.
803, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc–2000cc-5 (2012).
75
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Similar to RFRA, RLUIPA provides courts with a strict scrutiny test to
use when determining whether a prisoner’s fundamental rights were
violated.83
Moreover, under RLUIPA, once a prisoner sets forth a prima facie
case, the burden of persuasion shifts to the government.84 Although RFRA
was found to be unconstitutional and inapplicable specifically to prisoners
at state and local penitentiaries, Congress enacted RLUIPA through its
commerce and spending powers, not through Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, and limited its application to prisons receiving federal
funding.85 RLUIPA is a prime example of Congress’ “power of the
purse;”86 it holds federally funded state and local prisons accountable for
their actions and regulations by applying a strict scrutiny analysis to
prisoners’ claims.87 This leaves state prisons the option of refusing all
federal funding in order to avoid RLUIPA, an option that prisons, in the
face of growing financial concerns,88 are unlikely to choose.
The Supreme Court has upheld RLUIPA’s constitutionality in the
prison context. In Cutter v. Wilkinson,89 the Court held that the
Establishment Clause does not preempt RLUIPA because the law
“alleviates exceptional government-created burdens on private religious
exercise.”90 With prison safety often being a governmental concern in
religious exercise cases, however, the Court did not read RLUIPA “to
82

42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1.
The language that demonstrates that Congress triggered a strict scrutiny analysis for these issues
is “substantial burden,” “compelling governmental interest,” and “least restrictive means,” as is the
case with RFRA.
84
See RLUIPA, § 2000cc-2(b) (“If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim
alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this title, the
government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff
shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice
that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff’s exercise of religion.”).
85
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(b) (“This section applies in any case in which—(1) the substantial burden
is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance; or (2) the substantial
burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations,
among the several States, or with Indian tribes.”).
86
Power of the Purse, U.S. HOUSE REPRESENTATIVES: HIST., ART & ARCHIVES,
http://history.house.gov/Institution/Origins-Development/Power-of-the-Purse/ (last visited Feb. 6,
2016) (“Congress—and in particular, the House of Representatives—is invested with the ‘power of the
purse,’ the ability to tax and spend public money for national government.”).
87
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 (providing that both compelling government interest and least
restrictive means tests are applied when evaluating prisoners’ religious rights).
88
SUZANNE M. KIRCHOFF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41177, ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF PRISON
GROWTH 9 (2010) (“Corrections spending, as a share of state budgets, rose faster than health care,
education, and natural resources spending from 1986 to 2001. The average cost of housing a prisoner
for a year was about $24,000 in 2005, though rates vary from state to state.” (footnote omitted)).
89
544 U.S. 709 (2005).
90
Id. at 720.
83
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elevate accommodation of religious observances over an institution’s need
to maintain order and safety”91—RLUIPA still requires a weighing of the
regulation and reasons for that regulation with prisoners’ rights. Lastly, the
Court found that “RLUIPA does not differentiate among bona fide
faiths,”92 a concern which prison officials believe might incite instability
within prisons if prisoners think certain other prisoners are receiving
preferential treatment based on their religious beliefs.
i. Filing a Claim Under RLUIPA
For the purposes of this Note, this Part will examine how a state or
local prisoner may allege a RLUIPA violation. Additionally, it is important
to note that federal prisoners may file a similar allegation under RFRA, as
both statutes have similar elements. Thus, at the outset of bringing a
RLUIPA or RFRA challenge it is necessary to determine which statute
controls—if the prisoner is within a federal prison, RFRA controls; if the
prisoner is within a state or local prison that receives federal funding, then
RLUIPA controls.93
Congress set out a clear test for determining whether a prison’s actions
or regulations violate a prisoner’s right to religious freedom. First,
RLUIPA requires a prisoner to plead adequately three elements to make
out a prima facie case:
(1) that prison officials have imposed a “substantial burden”
on his [or her] “religious exercise” . . . ;
(2) that the “substantial burden” was either (a) imposed in a
program or activity that receives federal funds or (b) affects
interstate commerce . . . ; and
(3) that he [or she] has exhausted any available
administrative remedies.94
Once a plaintiff has set forth a prima facie case, the burden then shifts
to the defendant, whose actions or regulations are analyzed under strict
scrutiny.95 As with RFRA, under strict scrutiny, defendants must prove that
the burden they placed upon the prisoner was prompted by a “compelling
governmental interest” and that the substantial burden is the “least

91

Id. at 722.
Id. at 723.
93
See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing RLUIPA’s jurisdictional requirement).
94
Derek L. Gaubatz, RLUIPA at Four: Evaluating the Success and Constitutionality of RLUIPA’s
Prisoner Provisions, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 501, 514 (2005).
95
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (“If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim
alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this title, the
government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim . . . .”).
92
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restrictive means” of achieving that governmental interest. RLUIPA does
not specifically define these terms but “directs courts to apply established
precedent concerning what constitutes a compelling government interest
and the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.”97
Prisons most frequently include maintaining institutional security and
safety as compelling government interests.98 The Supreme Court, in
Sherbert v. Verner, however, stated that “[o]nly the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation”
and constitute a compelling interest.99 The Court in Sherbert also explained
that the “least restrictive means” prong of the strict scrutiny analysis
requires the defendant to prove that “no alternative forms of regulation
would combat” the defendant’s compelling interests without substantially
burdening the prisoner’s rights.100 Thus, this Note argues that if the
government cannot establish that its policy, which substantially burdens a
prisoner’s religious exercise, furthers a compelling interest and is the least
restrictive means of furthering that interest, then the prisoner will succeed
in his RLUIPA allegation.
96

ii. Recent RLUIPA Case Law
Prisoners in the hunger-striking context infrequently have utilized
RLUIPA as a way of preventing prisons from force-feeding them.101
Perhaps this is because they are unaware of this legal authority, or perhaps
it is because they do not realize that this avenue is available until after a
court issues an injunction for them to be force-fed. Recently, however,
more RLUIPA cases have surfaced, further revealing the statute’s
implications. The following Supreme Court and Second Circuit Court of
Appeals cases show how courts currently evaluate prisoners’ RLUIPA
claims.

96

Id. § 2000cc-1(a).
Gaubatz, supra note 94, at 540.
98
See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 823 (1974) (“[C]entral to all other corrections goals is
the institutional consideration of internal security within the corrections facilities themselves.”); see
also infra Part IV.B.3 (discussing in depth the various “compelling interests” that the government is
likely to assert in the hunger-strike context).
99
374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). Sherbert was a case about a Seventh-Day Adventist who was fired
and then denied unemployment benefits for failing to work Saturdays. Although that is a different
context than religiously based hunger-striking inmates, Sherbert’s compelling interest definition
nevertheless applies to religious infringement claims.
100
Id. at 407.
101
Typical RLUIPA claims include: challenging prison grooming and clothing policies,
restrictions on group worship, and limits on access to religious literature. See Gaubatz, supra note 94,
at 559–68.
97
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102

A. Holt v. Hobbs

In the most recent RLUIPA case to reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the
prisoner prevailed. Petitioner Gregory Holt, also known as Abdul Maalik,
is a prisoner in an Arkansas penitentiary.103 As a Muslim, Holt wished to
grow his beard in accord with the Muslim faith.104 The prison, however,
had a policy “which prohibit[ed] inmates from growing beards unless they
ha[d] a particular dermatological condition.”105 Although the Muslim
religion requires men not to trim their beards at all, Holt “proposed a
‘compromise’ under which he would grow only a 1/2-inch beard.”106
Upon analyzing Holt’s RLUIPA claim, the Court found that “the
religious exercise at issue [wa]s the growing of a beard, which petitioner
believe[d] [wa]s a dictate of his religious faith.”107 The Court also found
that the policy substantially burdened Holt’s exercise of religion because
the “grooming policy require[d] petitioner to shave his beard and thus to
engage in conduct that seriously violates [his] religious beliefs . . . [or] face
serious disciplinary action.”108
The burden then shifted to the government to show that the policy of
prohibiting Holt from growing a beard was the least restrictive means of
furthering a compelling governmental interest. The Department of
Corrections (DOC) argued that its grooming policy was in place to further
its compelling interest in maintaining prison safety and security.109 The
DOC further argued that this regulation was the least restrictive means of
maintaining prison safety by “prevent[ing] prisoners from hiding
contraband . . . [and] from disguising their identities.”110
The Court rejected both arguments for two reasons: first, because the
DOC failed to show that it could not further its interest in prison safety by
searching the prisoner’s beard;111 and second, because the Court believed
that the DOC could solve the problem of disguised identities “by requiring
that all inmates be photographed without beards when first admitted to the
facility and, if necessary, periodically thereafter.”112 Ultimately, the Court
found in favor of Holt that the policy prohibiting facial hair constituted a
102

135 S. Ct. 853 (2015).
Id. at 859.
104
Id.
105
Id.; see also id. at 860 (“[T]he Department’s grooming policy . . . provides that [n]o inmates
will be permitted to wear facial hair other than a neatly trimmed mustache that does not extend beyond
the corner of the mouth or over the lip.”).
106
Id. at 861.
107
Id. at 862.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 863.
110
Id. at 863–64.
111
Id. at 864.
112
Id. at 865.
103
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113

RLUIPA violation.
Therefore, because the prisoner was able to
demonstrate that the prison regulation substantially burdened his religious
exercise, he was able to plead a RLUIPA violation. It is important to note
that although not required of the prisoner, he did offer a compromise. This
compromise helped establish that there were other less restrictive means to
further the prison’s interest in maintaining the health and safety of its
prisoners.
B. Holland v. Goord114
Darryl Holland is an inmate who converted to Islam while incarcerated
in a New York correctional facility.115 After hearing that Holland was
using drugs, a prison captain ordered an officer to collect a urine sample
from the prisoner.116 At the time, there was a policy that “required that
inmates provide a urine sample within three hours of being ordered to do
so, without exception.”117 Holland, however, stated that he could not
provide a sample because he was observing a religious fast in accordance
with Ramadan.118 In an effort to comply with the urinalysis request,
“Holland offered to drink water and provide a sample after sunset, when
his fast had ended.”119 The prison declined Holland’s offer and, after he
failed to comply with the order, charged him with “violating the urinalysis
guidelines and defying a direct order. Holland was then placed in keeplock
pending a disciplinary hearing on the matter.”120 At the hearing, he was
sentenced to ninety days in keeplock and ninety days of lost privileges. 121
Holland then was released from keeplock after seventy-seven days of being
“confined to his cell for 23 hours each day, . . . barred from attending
Islamic services, including the Eid ul-Fitr feast celebrating the end of
Ramadan, allegedly received ‘punishment trays’ containing meager
portions, and lost his seniority and higher wage job at [the prison].”122
In response to the prison’s actions, Holland filed several complaints
including a RLUIPA claim “that the order to provide a urine sample and
his resultant confinement in keeplock violated his right to free exercise of
religion.”123 He also sought an order for a change to the Department of
Corrections urinalysis directive.124 It is important to note that “after seven
113

Id. at 867.
758 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2014).
115
Id. at 218.
116
Id.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 218–19.
119
Id. at 219.
120
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Id. at 220.
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years of litigation . . . DOCS added a ‘Note’ to Directive 4937,” advising
that
[i]nmates participating in an approved religious fast should
not be required to provide a urine sample during fasting
periods since consumption of water may be necessary.
Sample requests should be scheduled during other periods of
the day and normal urinalysis testing procedures should then
apply, including offering water to those inmates unable to
provide a urine sample.125
The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss because Holland
sought “monetary damages against state officers in either their official or
individual capacities,” which is not authorized by RLUIPA. 126 Also, the
court noted that Holland’s claim for injunctive relief was moot because the
DOC added a note which changed the policy to allow for religious
exceptions to the urinalysis protocol.127
Although the court ruled in favor of the defendants, they did express
that “[u]nder the [RLUIPA] analysis, Holland would likely prevail on the
substance of his RLUIPA claim.”128 It is easy to see why the court stated
this; as discussed below, had the defendants not made this change to the
policy, Holland likely would have been awarded injunctive relief in
response to his RLUIPA claim.129
IV. BEST METHOD OF LEGAL REDRESS: ALLEGING A RLUIPA VIOLATION
A. RLUIPA’s Protection of Prisoners’ Rights Against Being Force-Fed
RLUIPA affords state and local prisoners broader protection over their
religious rights than the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause. For this
reason, religiously based hunger-striking inmates should file a RLUIPA
violation in order to prevent the prison from force-feeding them.
Procedurally, RLUIPA “increase[s] the level of protection for prisoner
religious exercise beyond that of the Turner/O’Lone rational basis
standard” by requiring courts to analyze claims under strict scrutiny. 130
When a prisoner alleges a RLUIPA violation, courts apply a strict scrutiny
analysis to determine whether the prisoner’s religious rights were
substantially burdened and whether the prison’s policy was the least
restrictive means of furthering a compelling interest.131 Here, the
125

Id.
Id. at 224.
127
Id. at 223–24.
128
Id.
129
See infra Part V.C.
130
Gaubatz, supra note 94, at 553.
131
Id.
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government must establish that it had a compelling interest in effectuating
its policy and that the policy itself was the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.
By contrast, when a prisoner alleges that a prison policy violates his
First Amendment right to free exercise of his religion, courts apply the
Turner/O’Lone test, which merely requires the court to conduct a rational
basis test. For the government to successfully defeat the allegations, it
merely must demonstrate that its policy—infringing upon the prisoner’s
right to free exercise of religion—is rationally related to a legitimate
government interest. Under this standard, the government bears a much
lower burden and can easily dispense with prisoners’ religious rights.
Moreover, Congress’ purpose behind RLUIPA was to provide a way
for prisoners to obtain justice when they encounter hindrances to their
religious practices.132 The enactment of RLUIPA effectuated Congress’
intent to give legal redress to prisoners whose religious rights were
substantially burdened. As such, hunger-striking prisoners should allege a
RLUIPA violation in order to prevent prisons from force-feeding them.
B. How to Draft a Successful RLUIPA Claim
When drafting a RLUIPA violation in his complaint, the prisoner
carries the initial burden of proof to plead that the government’s action
substantially burdens the exercise of his religious beliefs.133 Once that is
adequately pled, the burden shifts to the government to show that its action
is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government
interest.134
1. Jurisdictional Requirement
RLUIPA specifically provides protections when “(1) the substantial
burden is imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial
assistance; or (2) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that
substantial burden would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among
the several States, or with the Indian tribes.”135 Thus, a state or local
132
See Taylor G. Stout, Note, The Costs of Religious Accommodation in Prisons, 96 VA. L. REV.
1201, 1204 n.7 (2010) (quoting a joint statement of Senators Hatch and Kennedy on the purpose of
RLUIPA stating that “[w]hether from indifference, ignorance, bigotry, or lack of resources, some
institutions restrict religious liberty in egregious and unnecessary ways.”) (citing 146 CONG. REC.
16,698–99 (2000)).
133
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b) (“If a plaintiff produces prima facie evidence to support a claim
alleging a violation of the Free Exercise Clause or a violation of section 2000cc of this title, the
government shall bear the burden of persuasion on any element of the claim, except that the plaintiff
shall bear the burden of persuasion on whether the law (including a regulation) or government practice
that is challenged by the claim substantially burdens the plaintiff's exercise of religion.”).
134
Id.
135
Id. § 2000cc-1(b).
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prisoner facing being force-fed first must show that RLUIPA applies to the
prison policy or action challenged. If the state or local prison at which the
prisoner is confined accepts federal funding, “RLUIPA will apply to all of
its programs.”136 Ultimately, because “[v]irtually every prison and jail
system accepts some federal money, . . . [a prisoner] can and should plead
in good faith in [his] complaint that the court has Spending Clause
jurisdiction.”137
Although this Note specifically describes how to file a RLUIPA claim,
federal prisoners may follow the same template by filing a similar
complaint under RFRA, which applies to federal prisons. Because both
RLUIPA and RFRA “prohibit laws and policies that substantially burden
the exercise of [prisoners’] religion, unless the restrictions further a
compelling governmental interest using the least restrictive means
available,”138 they are elementally similar. Thus, federal prisoners who are
engaged in a religiously based hunger strike should use the RLUIPA
template to file a complaint alleging a RFRA violation in order to prevent a
prison from force-feeding them.
2. Substantial Burden on Exercise of Religion
Once a prisoner establishes that RLUIPA applies, he must plead that
the prison’s policy substantially burdens his exercise of religion. Thus, the
prisoner must allege two things in his complaint: (1) that the policy creates
a substantial burden; and (2) that the policy burdens his sincerely held
religious beliefs.
First, demonstrating that the prison’s action or regulation has
substantially burdened a prisoner’s exercise of religion is not
straightforward. This is in part because RLUIPA does not provide a
definition for “substantial burden.”139 Courts, however, have set forth
various standards and definitions for what constitutes a substantial burden
on the exercise of religion. In Adkins v. Kaspar,140 the Fifth Circuit said
that:
[w]here the state conditions receipt of an important benefit
upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith, or where it
denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by
religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a

COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV., A JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S MANUAL ch. 27 (8th ed. 2009).
Id.
138
Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1; 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1.
139
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5 (listing defined terms, from which “substantial burden” is absent).
140
393 F.3d 559 (5th Cir. 2004).
136
137
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141

In that case, a prisoner filed a complaint stating that he had not been
allowed to observe rest and worship each Saturday for the Sabbath and for
other holy days.142
Relying on the definition of “substantial burden” announced by the
Seventh Circuit,143 the court found that the requirement of an outside
volunteer to be present in order for the prisoner and other members of the
Yahweh Evangelical Assembly to congregate on holy days was “a uniform
requirement for all religious assemblies at [the prison] with the exception
of Muslims” and “[did] not place a substantial burden on [the prisoner’s]
religious exercise.”144
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit defined a substantial burden on
religious exercise by using the meaning provided by Black’s Law
Dictionary and Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary as an action that
“must impose a significantly great restriction or onus upon such
exercise.”145 The Eleventh Circuit, declining to use the Seventh Circuit’s
definition, held that
a “substantial burden” must place more than an
inconvenience on religious exercise; a “substantial burden” is
akin to significant pressure which directly coerces the
religious adherent to conform his or her behavior
accordingly. Thus, a substantial burden can result from
pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious
precepts or from pressure that mandates religious conduct.146
Moreover, even the Supreme Court has had conflicting definitions of
what constitutes a “substantial burden” on religious freedom.147
141

Id. at 569 (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Indep. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18

(1981)).
142

Id. at 562.
See Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “a substantial burden
on the free exercise of religion, within the meaning of the Act, is one that forces adherents of a religion
to refrain from religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that
manifests a central tenet of a person’s religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is
contrary to those beliefs”).
144
Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 571 (5th Cir. 2004).
145
San Jose Christian Coll. v. City of Morgan Hill, 360 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2004).
146
Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004).
147
See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988) (finding that
“indirect coercion or penalties on the free exercise of religion, not just outright prohibitions, are subject
to scrutiny under the First Amendment”); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136,
141 (1987) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp’t Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 717–18 (1981))
(“Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct proscribed by a religious
faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of conduct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting
substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden upon
religion exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exercise is
143
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Although the definition has varied from circuit to circuit and even
within the Supreme Court itself, a common theme prevails. Courts
generally accept that pressuring or coercing a prisoner to change his or her
behavior or deviate from his or her religious beliefs constitutes a
substantial burden.148 Put simply, “the appropriate standard for determining
whether a burden is ‘substantial’ is to ask whether government action
either (1) puts pressure on individuals to modify their religious behavior or
(2) prevents them from engaging in religious conduct, in a way that is
greater than a mere inconvenience.”149 Thus, for a prisoner to successfully
plead a prima facie case and shift the burden of proof to the defendant in a
RLUIPA claim, he or she must plead coercion or pressure to deviate from
his sincerely held religious beliefs to satisfy the “substantial burden”
element.
Determining what constitutes religious exercise is simple, however, as
Congress took care to define it within RLUIPA. 150 As the definition of
“religious exercise” is fairly broad, the prisoner’s burden of showing that
he sincerely holds a religious belief is a low bar. The Act states that
religious exercise “includes any exercise of religion, whether or not
compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief.”151 The Supreme
Court has expanded this definition by noting that “the ‘exercise of
religion’ often involves not only belief and profession but the performance
of (or abstention from) physical acts: assembling with others for a worship
service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing,
abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation.”152 It is
important to note that to be considered religious exercise, the practices do
not have to be central to the religion’s tenets.153 However, “[b]ecause
nonetheless substantial.”).
148
See, e.g., Smith v. Ozmint, 578 F.3d 246, 251 (4th Cir. 2009) (finding that a prison grooming
policy that required an inmate to have close-cropped hair and authorized the forcible shaving of the
prisoner’s head substantially burdened his religious exercise because it compelled him to modify his
behavior against his religious beliefs); Shakur v. Selsky, 391 F.3d 106, 120 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that
preventing an inmate from attending Eid al-ul Fitr, an Islamic feast, substantially burdened his exercise
of religion by forcing him to change his behavior in opposition to his religious beliefs); Johns v.
Lemmon, 980 F. Supp. 2d 1055, 1059 (N.D. Ind. 2013) (holding that requiring a prisoner to pay for
Sabbath food in order to practice his faith is a substantial burden on his religious exercise); Willis v.
Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 753 F. Supp. 2d 768, 777 (S.D. Ind. 2010) (finding that the denial of
Kosher food substantially burdened the prisoner’s rights); Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 937,
946 (W.D. Wis. 2002) (stating that a Muslim prisoner’s inability to celebrate both the completion of
Ramadan and the Hajj with a communal meal each year substantially burdened his exercise of
religion).
149
Gaubatz, supra note 94, at 517.
150
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7).
151
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A).
152
Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
153
See RLUIPA, § 2000cc-5(7) (stating that religious exercise may be “any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief”) (emphasis added). This is in
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RLUIPA is a guarantor of sincerely held religious beliefs, it may not be
invoked simply to protect any way of life, however virtuous and admirable,
. . . if it is based on purely secular considerations.”154 Ultimately, in order
to present a prima facie case for a RLUIPA violation, a religiously based
hunger-striking prisoner should demonstrate in their complaint that their
hunger strike or fast stems from a sincerely held religious belief, and that
the prison’s attempt to force-feed him will substantially burden that belief
by making him choose between continuing his hunger strike and being
force-fed, or sacrificing his religious ideals by breaking fast or eating nonaccommodating meals in order to avoid being force-fed.
3. In Furtherance of a Compelling Governmental Interest
Once a prisoner demonstrates that the prison’s action or regulation
created a substantial burden on his exercise of religion, the burden then
shifts to the government to show that the decision or policy leading to the
substantial burden was in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest.155 Courts approach this inquiry with deference to prison officials
by acknowledging that prison administrators know best how to efficiently
and effectively run prisons.156 Although RLUIPA does provide prisoners
broader protections over their religious rights than the First Amendment’s
Free Exercise Clause,157 its purpose is not to reduce prison safety.158 Thus,
even though the courts review RLUIPA claims with deference to prison
officials, defendant-governments may not simply state that they have a
compelling interest when restricting the prisoner’s right to religious
freedom. Rather, they must plead a compelling governmental interest with
sufficient specificity to the situation.159
contrast to a RFRA analysis which requires the religious exercise to be a central tenet of a person’s
religious beliefs. See Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that “a substantial
burden on the free exercise of religion . . . is one that forces adherents of a religion to refrain from
religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests a central
tenet of a person’s religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs”
(emphasis added)).
154
Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 797 (7th Cir. 2008). In Koger, the Court explained that if a
prisoner’s “desire for a non-meat diet was rooted solely in concerns for his bodily health, it would not
be protected by RLUIPA.” Id.
155
42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(b); 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a).
156
See Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 (2005) (discussing how Congress intended for
courts to “apply the Act’s standard with due deference to the experience and expertise of prison and jail
administrators in establishing necessary regulations and procedures”).
157
See supra Part IV.A (discussing RLUIPA’s broad protections).
158
See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 722 (“RLUIPA [is not to be read] to elevate accommodation of
religious observances over an institution’s need to maintain order and safety.”). But see Lovelace v.
Lee, 472 F.3d 174, 190 (4th Cir. 2006) (finding that “a court should not rubber stamp or mechanically
accept the judgments of prison administrators . . . [but must take] into account any institutional need to
maintain good order, security, and discipline or to control costs”).
159
See Washington v. Klem, 497 F.3d 272, 283 (3d Cir. 2007) (“Even in light of the substantial
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Not only must the government enumerate a compelling interest, they
must also show that the specific policy or action furthers that compelling
governmental interest.160 For example, in response to a prisoner’s claim
that he has not received Kosher meals, a prison cannot simply state that its
compelling interest is keeping down prison administrative costs. Rather,
the government specifically must show how refusing to provide Kosher
meals and thereby forcing the prisoner to choose to eat nonaccommodating meals or be force-fed nutrients furthered its financial
interests. As discussed below, however, financial and economic concerns,
on their own, typically do not constitute compelling governmental
interests.
The most common compelling interests the government pleads are: the
preservation of life,161 maintenance of prison safety and administration,162
and implementation of cost-effective practices.163
a. Preservation of Life
In response to a prisoner’s allegation that a prison policy violates
RLUIPA, the most likely compelling interest that the state will allege is its
interest in preserving human life. Courts have found the government’s duty
to protect and care for its inmates, its interest in preventing suicide, and its
interest in enhancing the sanctity of life as compelling governmental
interests.164 The rationale behind the state’s interest in the preservation of
life is “that the state has an obligation to protect the [prisoners’]
welfare.”165 Additionally, prison officials believe that if a prison allows a
prisoner to die during a hunger strike, riots within the prison will ensue.
Although the “state’s interest in the preservation of life has been
characterized as compelling by most courts,”166 other courts have often
found that prisoners have the right to refuse to eat food forbidden by their
religious beliefs.
deference given to prison authorities, the mere assertion of security or health reasons is not, by itself,
enough for the Government to satisfy the compelling governmental interest requirement.”).
160
See id. (“Rather, the particular policy must further this interest. . . . A conclusory statement is
not enough.”).
161
See Silver, supra note 5, at 642.
162
See Cutter, 544 U.S. at 725 n.13 (stating that “prison security is a compelling state interest, and
that deference is due to institutional officials’ expertise in this area”).
163
See Willis v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 753 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778 (“RLUIPA specifically
contemplates that the law ‘may require a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid
imposing a substantial burden.’. Because the statute expressly anticipates increased costs, the fact that
such diets may be costlier than non-religious diets is not alone a compelling governmental interest
under the statute.” (citation omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-3(c))).
164
See Joel K. Greenberg, Note, Hunger Striking Prisoners: The Constitutionality of ForceFeeding, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 752 n.42 (1983).
165
Steven C. Sunshine, Note, Should a Hunger-Striking Prisoner Be Allowed to Die?, 25 B.C. L.
REV. 423, 441 (1984).
166
Id.
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The government may argue that “[b]ecause unnecessary death arguably
cheapens the value of life, perhaps [it] should be permitted to force-feed a
hunger striker.”167 In the hunger-striking context, however, this argument
“does not consider whether the sanctity of life could be enhanced by
allowing a hunger striker to die.”168 This Note does not seek to resolve or
address the complex ethical question of the “right to die” that arises not
only here, but also in various other contexts such as with terminally ill
patients. Rather, this Note focuses on addressing the myriad alternatives
the prison has which are less restrictive means to ending hunger strikes
than force-feeding an inmate.
b. Institutional Security
The government may also argue that its policy to force-feed a hungerstriking prisoner furthers its interest in keeping the prison secure by
preventing riots and not allowing other prisoners to think that the prison
will give in to a prisoner’s demands because the prisoner refuses food.169
The Supreme Court determined this interest to be the most important penal
interest.170 Moreover, the Court identified the preservation of the
institution’s “internal order and discipline”171 as an institutional interest.
This interest “recognizes the need for prison officials to maintain control
within prison walls.”172
Although riots stemming from prisoners’ perceptions that the prison
shows favoritism to religion might be a valid governmental interest, it is
unlikely that the hunger-striking prisoners discussed in this Note173 would
encourage other prisoners to also hunger strike. These prisoners do not
seek broad changes, but rather hunger strike in order to comply with their
sincerely held religious beliefs. Thus, these penological interests are not
necessarily compelling in this particular context.
c. Economic Interests
Courts have said that cost concerns alone typically do not rise to the
level of being considered a compelling government interest.174 The
government, however, can plead cost concerns as compelling interests if
167

Greenberg, supra note 164, at 760 (footnote omitted).
Id.
169
See id. at 764 (discussing how hunger strikers may encourage other prisoners to hunger strike,
which would burden the administration of the prison).
170
See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 546–47 (1979) (discussing the importance of prison
officials being able to maintain prison order and security).
171
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
172
Sunshine, supra note 165, at 443.
173
This Note is limited in scope to prisoners who hunger strike for lack of religiously
accommodating meals and those who are perceived to be hunger-striking but who are merely
participating in a religious fast.
174
Willis v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 753 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
168
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175

they tie the concern to safety risks.
In the hunger-striking context
specifically, the government might allege that providing specific diets for
every individual religion would be costly for the prison in terms of
monetary costs for the food itself and for staffing and administration
necessary to make these changes. The prison might tie these cost concerns
into safety risks because some non-religious inmates or inmates of other
religions might view the prison accommodating certain religions as
showing favoritism, which may result in riots.
4. Least Restrictive Means
Even if the government succeeds in demonstrating that its policy
furthers a compelling government interest, still it is unlikely to establish
that the policy of force-feeding the hunger-striking prisoner is the least
restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.176
Moreover, a prison “cannot meet its burden to prove least restrictive means
unless it demonstrates that it has actually considered and rejected the
efficacy of less restrictive measures before adopting the challenged
practice.”177 It is important to note that “[u]nder RLUIPA, it is not the
plaintiff's burden to show that reasonable alternatives do exist—it is [the
defendant’s] burden to show that reasonable alternatives do not exist.”178
Although it is not the prisoner’s burden to show reasonable alternatives
exist, it would be persuasive to present arguments in the RLUIPA motion
as to why the prison’s force-feeding policy is not the least restrictive means
of furthering its governmental interest.
In Willis v. Commissioner, Indiana Department of Corrections,179 for
example, the plaintiff-prisoners claimed that the Department of Corrections
(DOC) violated their RLUIPA rights by denying them Kosher meals.180
After the prisoners demonstrated that the prison’s refusal to provide them
with a Kosher diet was a substantial burden on their exercise of religion,181
the DOC argued that the “cost of kosher diets—when added to the Hallal
diets—was unacceptably high, thus creating a compelling governmental
interest in reducing ‘spiraling costs.’”182 The court emphasized that
“[w]ithout offering any additional reasons for terminating kosher meals,
175

See, e.g., Baranowski v. Hart, 486 F.3d 112, 125 (5th Cir. 2007) (finding cost to be a
compelling interest after the government showed that the budget was not big enough for a separate
kosher kitchen, such a policy would breed resentment and lead to a security risk, and there would be a
heightened demand for similar dietary accommodations).
176
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-1(a)(1)–(2).
177
Shakur v. Schriro, 514 F.3d 878, 890 (9th Cir. 2008).
178
Willis, 753 F. Supp. 2d at 779 (emphasis omitted) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)).
179
Id. at 768.
180
Id. at 770.
181
Id. at 776–77.
182
Id. at 778 (citations omitted).
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[it] [could not] find that the government had a compelling interest that
might justify burdening the religious exercise of Plaintiffs.”183 The court
then continued its RLUIPA analysis by saying that even if the DOC had
established that its cost concerns constituted a compelling government
interest, it had not demonstrated that “substituting vegan meals for kosher
ones [was] the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.”184 Further, the plaintiffs provided a list of
additional less restrictive alternatives that the DOC could have
implemented, to which the government did not even respond.185
Ultimately, the court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs because
the termination of Kosher diets violated RLUIPA.186
In the hunger-striking context, it is unlikely that the government would
be able to establish that force-feeding a prisoner who, for example, refused
to eat non-accommodating meals would be the least-restrictive means of
furthering its compelling interests in preserving life or keeping down
prison expenses. The prisoner could—and should—allege in his complaint
that other less restrictive means exist, such as providing the prisoner with
meals that accommodate his sincerely held religious beliefs.
V. APPLICATION TO PREVENT FORCE-FEEDING
Because RLUIPA offers greater protections of prisoners’ religious
freedoms than the First Amendment Free Exercise Clause, religiously
based hunger-striking prisoners in state and local prisons should file a
complaint alleging a RLUIPA violation in order to prevent prisons from
force-feeding them against their religious beliefs.
This Note will now examine how three categories of religiously based
hunger-striking prisoners should allege RLUIPA violations in order to
prevent the government from force-feeding them: (1) prisoners who are
hunger-striking for broad religious purposes; (2) prisoners who are hungerstriking due to a lack of an accommodating religious diet; and (3) prisoners
who are classified as “hunger-striking,” but instead are participating in a
religious fast. This Note will then analyze each category of hunger-striking
prisoners’ likelihood of success in preventing prisons from force-feeding
them if they properly allege a RLUIPA violation prior to a court issuing an
injunction allowing the prison to force-feed them.

183

Id.
Id. at 779.
185
Id. at 779–80 (listing less expensive Kosher vendors, a new contract with Aramark, Kosher
kitchens, or providing Kosher meals that need not be frozen as potential alternatives).
186
Id. at 780.
184
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A. Hunger-Striking for Broad Religious Purposes
The category of prisoners who hunger strike for broad religious
purposes likely will have the most difficult time of the three groups to
plead a RLUIPA claim. After pleading the jurisdictional requirement, next
the prisoner would need to plead that the prison’s policy of force-feeding
the inmate substantially burdened his religious exercise. As noted above,
the definition of “religious exercise” is fairly broad and thus is easy to
establish.187 To do so, the prisoner could plead that the act of the strike
served some part of that prisoner’s religious beliefs. Most religions fast for
one day at a time, or for certain hours of the day, so pleading that an
extended hunger strike is a religious exercise likely would be
challenging.188 Here, it is not as though the hunger strike is a tenet of the
prisoner’s religion—the prisoner may be striking, for example, to bring
attention to certain issues or beliefs of his or her specific religion. Thus,
although the definition of “religious exercise” is broad, it is unlikely that
the prisoner would be able to adequately plead that participating in a
hunger strike for a broad religious reason, rather than in conformity with
specific religious ideals, constitutes “religious exercise.”
The prisoner then must allege that the prison’s policy to force-feed him
would impose a substantial burden upon his or her religious exercise of
hunger-striking. Because force-feeding the prisoner either would end the
hunger strike or coerce the inmate to eat something to avoid being forcefed, the prisoner would have a fairly strong and straightforward argument
that the prison’s action of force-feeding substantially burdened his or her
right to exercise a religion of his choosing. But again, establishing that the
hunger strike, in the first place, was a “religious exercise,” would be a
difficult argument to make.
If the prisoner successfully presents a prima facie case, the burden then
would shift to the government to show that the action of force-feeding the
inmate was in furtherance of a compelling government interest. The prison
likely will argue that its compelling interest is in maintaining prison safety;
if other prisoners see that the prison gives in to demands for hunger strikes,
they might also engage in hunger strikes.189 Additionally, the state could
argue that it has an interest in preserving life and, depending on how long
the inmate has been hunger-striking, that force-feeding the prisoner is in
furtherance of protecting the safety of the inmate who is depriving himself
proper nutrition.
Although preservation of life likely would be a successful compelling
See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing how RLUIPA defines “religious exercise”).
See Fasting Across Religions, supra note 8 (describing, for example, the Jewish fast which
occurs from sunrise to sundown on Fridays, Yom Kippur, and Tisha B’Av).
189
See Silver, supra note 5, at 648 (discussing how discouraging “copycat[]” hunger strikers can
be for prisons because “the only thing worse than one hunger strike would be many hunger strikes”).
187
188
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governmental interest, the government then would have to demonstrate that
force-feeding the prisoner is the least restrictive means of ending the
inmate’s hunger strike. In this particular category of hunger-striking
inmates, the government could plead that no other alternative exists to get
the inmate to end his hunger strike—it is not as if the prison can solve a
broad religious issue. If, for example, the prisoner alleges that he is
hunger-striking to draw attention to perceived religious desecration at
Guantanamo Bay and the prisoner’s health is at a critical point, the
government likely will argue successfully that it had no other option but to
seek an injunction to force-feed the inmate. It could not solve the problem
for which the prisoner was hunger-striking, and so no other option would
be available. Thus, these cases are likely to be the most difficult of the
force-feeding RLUIPA claims to file—mostly due to the difficulty the
prisoner would have in demonstrating that the hunger strike, for broad,
religious purposes, falls within the definition of religious exercise.
Ultimately, in this specific category of hunger-striking inmates, an inmate
would not be successful in preventing the prison from force-feeding him.
B. Hunger-Striking for a Lack of Accommodating Religious Diet
The category of prisoners who hunger strike because they have not
been provided with religiously accommodating meals will very likely
prevent the prison from force-feeding these prisoners because it will be
fairly easy to adequately plead a RLUIPA violation. Oftentimes, prisoners
will strike because the prison has not provided them with an
accommodating diet in accord with their religion.190 After the state seeks
an injunction to force-feed the inmate, but prior to the court issuing a
ruling, the inmate should file a RLUIPA claim. The prisoner must then
plead the jurisdictional requirement.
Once the prisoner has established that RLUIPA applies to the prison in
which he is incarcerated, he then must plead that the prison’s policy of
force-feeding him substantially burdened his religious exercise. This
category of inmates easily can establish that the hunger strike is part of the
exercise of his religion. For example, suppose a Jewish inmate requested
Kosher meals, and the prison refused.191 Because the inmate sincerely
believes that eating non-Kosher food goes against his religion, he chose not
to eat the non-Kosher food. After several weeks, however, the prison
discussed with the prisoner having to force-feed him to ensure that he
remained healthy. Despite this warning, the inmate continued to abstain
190
See, e.g., Ben-Avraham v. Moses, 1 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 1993) (describing a case in which a
Hasidic Jewish prisoner went on strike because he was not provided with a kosher diet).
191
Also, for the purposes of this hypothetical, assume that the inmate meets weekly with the
prison Rabbi, and so there is no question about whether his beliefs are sincerely held.
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from eating the non-Kosher food in order to comply with his religious
beliefs. His refusal to eat for an extended amount of time would be
considered a hunger strike. Additionally, this inmate may refuse to take
any additional nutrients that the prison may offer in order to strike for a
change in prison policy to provide religiously accommodating meals. In
both instances, and in similar situations, the hunger strike certainly would
be considered “religious exercise”—the prisoner is striking in adherence to
his religion, which requires him to eat only Kosher food.192
Next, the inmate must plead that the prison’s policy of force-feeding
him substantially burdens his religious exercise. Since the threat of force
feeding the inmate would cause him to choose between consuming food
that is not permitted by his religion or undergoing the highly invasive and
intrusive ordeal of being force-fed, the inmate easily can argue that the
force-feeding substantially burdened the exercise of his religion.
Ultimately, the threat would force him to consume non-Kosher meals or he
would be force-fed non-Kosher nutrients. In either situation, the forcefeeding policy substantially burdens his exercise of religion.
The burden then would shift to the state to demonstrate that forcefeeding the inmate to end his hunger strike would be the least restrictive
means of furthering some compelling governmental interest. In this
category of hunger-striking inmates, the government likely will allege that
it has a compelling interest in preservation of life and maintaining
institutional security. A court likely would view preservation of life as a
compelling governmental interest, as the government has a duty to protect
those within its custody. The government also might allege that it has an
interest in maintaining institutional security—that allowing an inmate to
die in its care might incite riots. This also might be viewed as a compelling
governmental interest.
Even if a court agrees that the government’s policy to force-feed
hunger-striking prisoners furthers a compelling governmental interest, in
this category of hunger-striking prisoners, the state will fail, as it will not
be able to demonstrate that force-feeding the prisoner is the least restrictive
means of furthering this interest. If, for example, a prisoner is hungerstriking because the prison does not provide him Kosher meals, even
though he sincerely holds beliefs akin to Judaism, it seems less restrictive
simply to provide that prisoner with a Kosher meal rather than to strap him
down and insert a tube down his throat or pierce his veins with a needle.
The government cannot then claim that it is not economically feasible to do
this because “RLUIPA specifically contemplates that the law ‘may require
a government to incur expenses in its own operations to avoid imposing a
192

The government might also try to argue that the prisoner does not hold sincere religious
beliefs. Because of this, it is important that the prisoner adequately plead sufficient facts to establish
that he holds legitimate religious beliefs in his or her complaint.
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substantial burden.’” An obvious less restrictive means to ending the
prisoner’s hunger strike would be to provide religiously accommodating
meals.
Moreover, if a prisoner partakes in a hunger fast during the sun-up
hours of Ramadan based on his sincerely held Islamic beliefs and the
prison fails to provide adequately nutritious meals during the sundown
hours, that prisoner’s refusal to eat during the sun-up hours for the entire
month could be considered to be a hunger strike. Again, it seems less
restrictive for the prison simply to provide meals to the Muslim prisoner
during sun-down hours of the month of Ramadan than to subject that
prisoner to extremely intrusive and sometimes barbaric force-feeding.
Because no standard method currently exists as to how to address hungerstriking inmates, it is hard to see how this painful and intrusive method of
force-feeding could be seen as the least restrictive means to achieve any of
the prison’s potential interests. Thus, this category of hunger-striking
prisoners likely would succeed in preventing the prison from force-feeding
them by adequately pleading a RLUIPA violation in its complaint against
the prison.
193

C. Religious Fasting
Members of various religions partake in fasts for different amounts of
time. With the seventy-two-hour prison guideline to declare a hunger
strike, however, legitimate hunger fasts may be misclassified as hunger
strikes by the prison. Should a prison classify a hunger fast as a hunger
strike and seek an injunction to force-feed an inmate, that inmate should
file a RLUIPA claim. These claims would look similar to those filed by
prisoners who engage in a hunger strike due to a lack of accommodating
meals, and would have the same high probability of success.
After the state seeks an injunction to force-feed an inmate, but prior to
the court issuing a ruling, the inmate should file a complaint alleging a
RLUIPA violation. To plead his prima facie case, the inmate must
establish the jurisdictional requirement, and that the government’s forcefeeding policy substantially burdens his religious exercise of engaging in a
hunger fast.
Take, for example, Darryl Holland’s situation in the recent Second
Circuit case.194 The Court stated that Holland’s RLUIPA claim would not
have been moot and would have been successful had the Department of
Corrections not changed its policy regarding obtaining urine samples from

Willis v. Comm’r, Ind. Dep’t of Corr., 753 F. Supp. 2d 768, 778 (S.D. Ind. 2010).
Holland v. Goord, 758 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2014); see also supra text accompanying notes 114–
129 (describing the Holland v. Goord case).
193
194
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Muslim prisoners engaging in a religious fast during Ramadan. Although
the court did not explain its reasoning, by following the RLUIPA template
offered in this Note we can examine why this would be the case for
hunger-fasting inmates facing being force-fed by a prison.
First, the inmate would need to file a complaint alleging a RLUIPA
violation prior to the court ordering an injunction to allow the government
to force-feed him. In this complaint, the inmate would need to plead the
jurisdictional requirement. Then, he must establish that his participation in
the hunger fast was part of his religious exercise. In Holland’s case, that
was easy to do, as he was fasting during the sun-up hours of Ramadan.
Holland must then adequately plead that the policy directive requiring
him to provide a urine sample during daylight hours substantially burdened
his exercise of religion. The exercise of religion in question would be
Holland’s ability to continue to participate in a fast during sun-up hours in
accordance with Ramadan. The policy of requiring prisoners to submit to
urinalysis testing within three hours substantially burdened Holland’s
exercise of religion because it forced him to choose between following his
sincerely held religious beliefs and being punished for refusing to drink
water to provide a urine sample, and breaking his fast in opposition to his
religious beliefs.
The burden then would shift to the government to show that the
urinalysis policy was in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest
and would be the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The
government would likely argue that the compelling interest would be to
preserve Holland’s life and to maintain prison safety. Although these are
compelling governmental interests, the government would not be able to
demonstrate that force-feeding Holland nutrients is the least restrictive
means of furthering this interest. The prison could wait until the sun-down
hours of Ramadan and then offer Holland nutrients so that he may provide
the urine sample. This least restrictive means is evidenced by the DOC
adding a note to the policy to make religious exceptions.196 Thus, had
Holland filed a complaint alleging a RLUIPA violation prior to the prison
force-feeding him nutrients which caused him to break his religious fast, he
would have been successful in preventing the force-feeding.
Take, for another example, a Muslim inmate who fasts during the sunup hours of Ramadan but is confined to a prison that does not provide
meals after sundown. The inmate then refuses nutrients during the sun-up
hours out of respect for his religion, and so midway through the month of
Ramadan, the prison classifies the inmate as a hunger-striker. Despite the
prison’s discussions with the inmate that if he continues to refuse nutrients
195

Holland, 758 F.3d at 224.
Id. at 220 (describing how the DOC added a directive exempting religiously fasting prisoners
from the typical time period required for submitting a urine sample).
196
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and his weight and health continue to decline that they will need to forcefeed him, the inmate stays true to his religious ideals and refuses nutrients.
The prison then seeks an injunction to force-feed him.
Here, the inmate should file a complaint alleging a RLUIPA violation.
He can easily establish that the fast is a part of his religion—he is fasting
during the sun-up hours to comply with his religion and is then forced to
fast during the sun-down hours because the prison does not provide
religiously accommodating meals so that he may consume nutrients when
he is not religiously fasting.
The prisoner, then, would show that force-feeding him would
substantially burden his exercise of religion. The threat of force-feeding
the prisoner would likely pressure him to break the fast, which would go
against his religious beliefs. If the prisoner continues the fast, force-feeding
him would break the fast, clearly burdening his religious beliefs.
The burden then would shift to the government to show that its forcefeeding the inmate would be in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest. The government likely will argue that force-feeding the inmate
would be in furtherance of preserving his life. Although this is a
compelling governmental interest, the government would not be able to
establish that force-feeding the inmate would be the least-restrictive means
of furthering its interest. An obvious least restrictive means to ending the
prisoner’s hunger strike would be to provide the prisoner with meals at
sun-down during the month of Ramadan. Thus, prisoners in this situation
would likely successfully deter an injunction to force-feed them by filing a
complaint alleging a RLUIPA violation.
D. A Hypothetical: Steven Hayes
Convicted killer and death row inmate Steven Hayes recently filed a
complaint in the U.S. District Court for the District of Connecticut based
on his assertion that his religious rights were being violated by the prison’s
refusal to provide him with stricter Kosher meals.197 Hayes brought a
RLUIPA claim for monetary damages against the director of religious
services for the Connecticut Department of Corrections, a warden, a
district warden, and all members of the Religious Review Committee.198
Hayes’ main complaint was that the prison did not provide him with strict
Kosher meals.199 Thus, he claimed to have “been suffering almost
starvation for the past year.”200 Hayes sought compensatory damages and a
declaratory judgment to ensure future compliance with any favorable
197
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ruling he may receive, and injunctive relief in the form of: (1) providing
prepackaged Kosher meals to all Jewish prisoners; and (2) requiring the
Department of Justice to investigate and oversee the Kosher meal program
in Connecticut prisons.201
The government argued, in its motion to dismiss, that the DOC
Common Fare menu, which was offered at the prison where Hayes was
located, had been deemed constitutional and Kosher.202 In fact, “[t]his
Court reviewed and approved the Connecticut DOC Common Fare menu,
most recently in Wortham v. Lantz, which held that providing Common
Fare meals to inmates requiring kosher meals furthered the compelling
governmental interests of controlling costs and reducing administrative
burdens.”203
Ultimately, the court denied Hayes’ motions.204 Judge Alvin
Thompson noted that “[a]lthough (Hayes) raise[d] as an issue the lack of a
reliable orthodox certificate or an onsite Jewish overseer, he provide[d] no
evidence suggesting that their absence le[d] to a finding that the meals
[were] not kosher.”205 By denying Hayes’ motions, the judge “found there
is not a likelihood that [Hayes] will succeed.”206
If, however, the prison had sought an injunction to force-feed Hayes
due to his hunger strike, he could file another complaint alleging a
RLUIPA violation. His complaint, however, would likely be unsuccessful.
The burden would first be on Hayes to show that force-feeding him would
substantially burden his exercise of religion. He could argue that the
exercise of religion is his hunger-striking due to the prison’s refusal to
provide religiously accommodating meals.
Force-feeding him would require him to choose between eating nonKosher food in opposition to his religious beliefs or being force-fed against
his will. His ability to plead a prima facie case would hinge upon whether
the court believed he had a sincerely held belief in Judaism, and that the
prison’s meals were truly non-Kosher. Based on the current court
documents, it appears that the prison meals in fact are Kosher and that the
preparation of these meals is supervised by Rabbis. Thus, it is unlikely that
Hayes would be able to plead a prima facie case to avoid being force-fed.
If Hayes successfully pled a prima facie case, then the burden would
201
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204
See Pat Eaton-Robb, Death Row Inmate Steven Hayes Loses Fight for Kosher Food,
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shift to the government to show that force-feeding Hayes would be in
furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and is the least
restrictive means of doing so. The government would likely argue that is
has a compelling interest in preserving the life of and ensuring the safety of
a prisoner whose health is rapidly deteriorating. This likely would be
viewed as a compelling governmental interest. Moreover, because the
meals actually are Kosher, the prison could argue that force-feeding Hayes
is the least-restrictive means to preserving his life. Therefore, changing the
meals is not an option, and only a change in the meals would end his
hunger strike. Thus, even if Hayes does plead a prima facie case alleging a
RLUIPA violation, the government would likely successfully defeat it, as
force-feeding him would be in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering that interest.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court infrequently, in the past, has considered RLUIPA
claims. Most recently, however, in Holt v. Hobbs, a prisoner successfully
sued the government for infringing upon his religious beliefs. This, in
addition to the recent Hobby Lobby207 decision, shows that the Supreme
Court is receptive to claims of violations of religious rights. With recent
religious victories at the Supreme Court level for RLUIPA claims,
prisoners who are hunger-striking or fasting for religious purposes would
likely be successful in deterring an injunction to be force-fed if they pled
RLUIPA violations, rather than First Amendment violations, as RLUIPA
forces courts to analyze the claim under strict scrutiny, rather than rational
basis. Thus, religiously based hunger-striking prisoners who seek to
prevent the prison from force-feeding them would have the strongest
chance of success by filing a complaint alleging a RLUIPA violation.
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Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (holding that, based upon RFRA
analysis, for-profit corporations are exempt from a law to which its owners religiously object if there is
a less restrictive means of furthering the law’s interest).

